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I. INTRODUCTION
When a hospital is found liable for medical negligence, not only does the
hospital pay the damages, so too does the consumer. In an era where health
care costs are a prominent issue of concern for society as a whole, public policy
clearly favors any available means of containment of these costs.
The underlying rationale for holding hospitals liable for negligent acts of
their employees is based on the "deep pocket" theory of vicarious liability.2 This
theory imposes liability on the party who is, theoretically, in the best position
to pay.3 The Ohio Supreme Court manifested its belief in the deep pocket theory
in Clark v. Southview Hospital & FamilyHealth Center.4 In Clark, the Ohio Supreme
1628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
2 See Section II infra which discusses vicarious liability and explains the deep pocket
theory.
31d.
4628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
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Court further expanded the means by which a hospital could be held
vicariously liable in medical malpractice cases under the theory of agency by
estoppel.
In essence, the Clark decision renders hospitals strictly liable for negligent
acts of physicians providing medical care within a hospital. The only apparent
exception under Clark is where a patient and her personal physician
independently choose a hospital as a situs for medical treatment. 5
The Clark decision will have significant ramifications for Ohio hospitals. It
will undoubtedly affect insurance costs, contractual arrangements between
hospitals and physicians, and ultimately, consumer costs. Clearly it is
questionable whether this decision furthered public policy.
In Clark, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth a test a plaintiff must meet in order
to hold a hospital vicariously liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel.
6
The court based its test on numerous such decisions from jurisdictions across
the country.7 However, the legal soundness of Clark and the decisions on which
it relied is questionable, as many of these jurisdictions misapplied the legal
doctrines underlying agency by estoppel theory.
This article analyzes the legal doctrines on which agency by estoppel is
based, how this theory of vicarious liability has evolved in Ohio, and how state
courts across the country have applied and misapplied this theory.
II. THE COMPLEXITIES OF AGENCY BY ESTOPPELAS A MEANS OF IMPOSING
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Traditionally, hospitals were immune from liability under the doctrine of
charitable immunity.8 Once the doctrine of charitable immunity was abolished,
hospitals were subject to financial responsibility for the tortious acts of servants
and/or agents, under the doctrine of vicarious liability,9 also known as
respondeat superior,10 or "Let the master answer." The underlying rationale of
vicarious liability aims to impose the financial cost of tortious conduct on the
party who is in the best position to pay the cost.11 This party is usually the
principal, who has the ability to distribute the cost to the public or community
5 d. at 53.
6See discussion infra Section M.D.
7628 N.E.2d at 53.
85ee discussion infra Section l.A.
9Vicarious liability has been defined as: "[By reason of some relation existing
between A and B, the negligence of A is to be charged against B, although B has played
no part in it, has done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all
that he possibly can to prevent it." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF ToRTs, § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984).
101d. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1084 (6th abr. ed. 1991).
11KEETON Er AL., supra note 9, § 69, at 500.
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at large through mechanisms such as price adjustments and liability
insurance.
12
Hospitals were historically held immune from liability for the tortious acts
of staff physicians, as physicians working therein were considered
independent contractors rather than employees. Generally, agency theory
refuses to hold an employer liable for tortious acts of independent contractors
because the employer has no control over their conduct.13 It logically follows
that because a hospital, per se, cannot practice medicine, it cannot control the
conduct of its physicians, rendering a hospital immune.14
Gradually, this exception gave way as well, as hospitals grew in size, began
offering comprehensive care, and operating for profit The doctrine of agency
by estoppel, historically prevalent in the commercial arena, imposes liability
upon a "master" for tortious acts of retained independent contractors where a
third party relies on the appearance of an agency relationship between the
master and the independent contractor. 15
The terms "agency by estoppel,"16 "ostensible agency,"17 and "apparent
authority"18 are often used interchangeably. 19 The intermingling of these terms
and, more importantly, their doctrines, has caused confusion, as courts
applying one or more of them are unclear as to whether proof of reliance on
the part of the plaintiff is required before a plaintiff may recover under this
theory. This confusion has produced numerous decisions nationwide which
12 Id. at§ 69 & 71.
131d. at § 71. See also John D. Hodson, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Sanitarium
for Negligence of Physician or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R.4th 266-70 (1987).
14See Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 373 P.2d 944 (Colo. 1962). But see Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1957).
15Agency by estoppel is defined as:
One created by operation of law and established by proof of such acts
of the principal as reasonably lead third person to the conclusion of its
existence. Arises where principal, by negligence in failing to supervise
agent's affairs, allows agent to exercise powers not granted to him, thus
justifying others in believing agent possesses requisite authority.
BLACK's LAW DICTnONARY 40 (6th abr. ed. 1991).
16 1d.
1 7 Defined as:
An implied or presumptive agency, which exists where one, either
intentionally or from want of ordinary care, induces another to believe
that a third person is his agent, though he never in fact employed him.
It is, strictly speaking, no agency at all, but is in reality based entirely
upon estoppel.
Id. at 760.
18 Defined as: "[S]uch authority as the principal knowingly or negligently permits
the agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out as possessing." Id. at 62.
19 See Diane M. Janulis & Alan D. Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't:
Hospitals' Liability for Physicians'Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REV. 689, 696 (1985).
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promulgate rules and tests for applying agency by estoppel while failing to
recognize or adhere to the legal principles upon which this doctrine is based.
When applying the doctrine of agency by estoppel, courts look to either, and
sometimes both, § 429 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 20 or § 267 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCy, 21 to determine what factors a plaintiff must
prove to successfully recover. Unfortunately, many of these courts fail to
recognize the critical distinction between these two sections.
In a medical malpractice setting, § 267 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY (hereinafter referred to as "Agency § 267") requires a plaintiff to show:
(1) a representation by the hospital that the allegedly negligent physician is his
servant or agent; and (2) the plaintiff, or injured party, must justifiably rely
upon the skill or care of the apparent agent to his detriment. 22 Comment a to
Agency § 267 specifically sets forth that an injured party's belief that an actor
(physician) is the defendant's (hospital) servant is insufficient to impose
liability.23 Comment a further states, "'There must be such reliance upon the
manifestation as exposes the plaintiff to the negligent conduct."24
Alternately, § 429 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (hereinafter
referred to as "Torts § 429") requires a showing that the plaintiff accepted the
independent contractor's services under the reasonable belief that the care was
being provided by the employer (hospital) or by servants (physicians) of the
employer.25 Comment a to Torts § 429 expands this section's provisions by
stating that liability may also be found where a third party held the requisite
20This Restatement section entitled, "Negligence in Doing Work Which is Accepted
in Reliance on the Employer's Doing the Work Himself," states:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services
are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to
liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor
in supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer
were supplying them himself or by his servants.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1964).
21Agency § 267, entitled "Reliance upon Care or Skill of Apparent Servant or Other
Agent", states:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill
of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm
caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or
other agent as if he were such.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENcY § 267 (1958).
22 Id.
231d. at cmt. a.
24nd.
25 See supra note 20.
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reasonable belief and procured the services in question on behalf of the injured
party.2
6
The critical distinction between these two Restatement sections is that
Agency § 267 requires establishment of an estoppel, while Torts § 429 does not
and, instead, only requires a showing of an apparent agency. This difference
may appear trivial to one making a cursory reading of these sections, but
whether a court deems Agency § 267 or Torts § 429 applicable will have a
marked effect on the outcome of a case, as under either section, one party will
be faced with a nearly insurmountable standard to overcome.
Where Agency § 267 is applied, a plaintiff will bear the onus of
demonstrating: (1) the hospital represented that the doctor was their
employee; (2) she believed that the physician who treated her was an employee
of the hospital at the time of treatment; and (3) she relied on this belief to her
detriment.27 Because an injured person, in an emergency situation, typically
does not choose the situs for treatment, it is unlikely that a plaintiff will be able
to meet this burden.
28
Alternately, when Torts § 429, or the apparent agency doctrine, is applied, a
defendant-hospital will rarely be able to defend itself since a plaintiff will only
have to demonstrate that she accepted the services of the independent
contractor with the general belief that the physicians within the hospital were
its employees.29 Consequently, meeting the elements of Torts § 429 is
significantly easier for a plaintiff as neither a representation by a hospital, nor
reliance on that representation, need be shown. The significantly lower burden
of proof under Torts § 429 will render a hospital, in essence, strictly liable.30
261d. at cmt. a.
27 See supra note 21. See also Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1381 (Alaska 1987);
Janulis & Hornstein, supra note 19, at 696-97.
28 See Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684,692 (W. Va. App. Div. 1991), where the
court held:
We find the application of ostensible agency particularly compelling
when a patient seeks services from an emergency room. In such circum-
stances, there is often no time to arrange for the services of a private
physician, and, in effect, the patient has no other choice but the emer-
gency room. Frequently, the situation is tense, with the patient's family
and friends in an emotional state.
See also, Hannola v. Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
29See Claire Grandprg Combs, Comment, Hospital Vicarious Liability for the Negligence
of Independent Contractors and Staff Physicians: Criticisms of Ostensible Agency Doctrine in
Ohio, 56 U. CQN. L. REv. 711, 733 (1987).
30The distinction between strict liability and vicarious liability is slight as in both
circumstances a party is held liable even though free from any fault. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 9.
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL FOR OHIO HOSPITALS
The distinction between the two possible applications discussed above, as
well as their contradictory effects, has not gone unnoticed by the judiciary.
Ohio's decisions concerning agency by estoppel are a microcosm of the
confusion state courts across the nation have experienced concerning this
doctrine. This section will analyze the development of agency by estoppel in
Ohio from the early cases which recognized no hospital liability whatsoever,
to the recent decision of Clark v. Southview Hospital & Family Health Center,3 1
which virtually renders hospitals strictly liable for all negligent acts of their
staff physicians.
A. The Cases Which Set The Stage
In 1911, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n,32
adopted the doctrine of charitable immunity for hospitals. The Taylor court
concluded vicarious liability should not apply to hospitals because they
operated "solely for a public use and a public benefit."3 3 Forty-five years later,
in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital,34 the court abolished charitable immunity for
hospitals.35 The Avellone court found that a tension existed between the right
of nonprofit hospitals to derive any available benefit from society and the right
of injured parties to seek recovery, which had shifted since the Taylor decision
from favoring the hospitals to favoring injured parties.36 In the court's view,
the major factors contributing to this shift was the status of hospitals as
31628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
3296 N.E. 1089 (Ohio 1911), overruled by Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 135 N.E.2d 410
(Ohio 1956).
3396 N.E.2d at 1092. The court held: "A public charitable hospital, organized as such
and open to all persons, although conducted under private management, is not liable
for injuries toa patient of thehospital, resulting from thenegligenceof a nurseemployed
by it." Id. at 1089.
34135 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1956).
35 The doctrine of charitable immunity for any charitable organization was later
abolished in Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass'n, 466 N.E.2d 867 (Ohio 1984).
36 On the one hand there is the well recognized right of nonprofit hospitals
to any benefit and assistance which society and the law can justly allow
them-a right which they command by their very nature; and on the
other hand we see the right of the individual injured by the negligence
of a servant to look for recompense to the master of such servant, under
respondeat superior.
Up to this point... this court has apparently felt that the benefit to
society as a whole, gained by granting immunity, weighed the former
right in favor of the latter, and this was on the ground that such masters
were 'different from others,' and that immunizing them was a 'valuable
aid in securing the ends of justice.'
In our opinion this conclusion is no longer justified.
135 N.E.2d at 414.
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profitable businesses and the ability of hospitals to obtain liability insurance,
which was not available at the time of the Taylor decision.37
The first significant application of agency by estoppel was in 1941 by the
Ohio Supreme Court in the context of a dispute between a store owner who
had retained an independent contractor to sell meat on his premises. In Rubbo
v. Hughes Provision Co.,38 an owner of a market that leased space to independent
dealers was found vicariously liable for the acts of an independent contractor
who sold contaminated meat. The Rubbo court relied on the supreme court's
discussion of estoppel in Globe Indemnity Co. v. Wassman,3 9 where a surety was
held estopped from denying liability for failure to comply with statutory
provisions for such claims.40 The Globe court found that for an estoppel to be
created, representations need not be made to the specific party asserting
estoppel, but rather could be made to a third person who would then
communicate it to the plaintiff, to a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a
member, or to the public in general.4 1 Using the definition of estoppel set forth
by Globe, the Rubbo court clearly adopted the theory of apparent agency now
embodied by Torts § 429.
37The Avellone court stated:
The policy that the funds of a nonprofit hospital should not be diverted
for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was organized,
causing a depletion of the hospital's resources, and thus immunizing
them from liability no longer has any foundation in our present day
economy. Under present day conditions a hospital may fully protect
its funds by the use of liability insurance, and, since such funds may
be used to recompense those who are injured through the negligent
selection of servants and strangers, there is no reason why such funds
may not be used in the purchasing of insurance which will protect
not only the hospital and its funds but also any person injured
through its negligence or the negligence of its servants.
Id. at 415.
3834 N.E.2d 202 (Ohio 1941). The court held:
Where the proprietor of a provision market advertises an article for
sale in his market and a purchaser, in reliance that he was buying
from such proprietor and without knowledge to the contrary, buys
such advertised article at a counter in the market which the proprietor
had leased to another, which counter was the only place in the market
where the article in question was to be found, the doctrine of agency
by estoppel applies, and in an action against such proprietor for injuries
resulting from such sale, the proprietor will not be heard to deny that
the lessee of the counter space was proprietor's agent.
Id. at 203.
39165 N.E. 579 (Ohio 1929).
4034 N.E.2d at 205.
41 d. at 204-05. In reaching this holding, the Rubbo court relied on 16 OHIo
JURISPRUDENCE 604, § 50 and the Globe decision.
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The Rubbo decision was subsequently applied by the Ohio Supreme Court
in Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co.42 In Johnson, the plaintiff was attempting to
impose liability upon a store owner in much the same situation as Rubbo, but
the court found the plaintiff failed to establish an agency by estoppel because
she failed to show actual reliance on the alleged agency relationship.43 The
Johnson court defined agency by estoppel as when "one has been led to rely
upon the appearance of agency to his detriment ... or some other change in
position has occurred, in reliance upon the appearance of authority."44 It
appears the Johnson court disagreed with the lenient standard set forth by
Rubbo, as it imposed a more stringent standard which is now embodied in
Agency § 267.
Agency by estoppel was again applied by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Councell v. Douglas.45 The Councell court refused to hold the defendant liable
under this doctrine since the plaintiff failed to show induced reliance on the
alleged relationship or any harm resulting therefrom. 46 The court expressly
relied on § 265 of the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY and found that reliance is a
requisite element of agency by estoppel.47
Agency by estoppel was first extended beyond the commercial setting, to a
hospital, in Cooper v. Sisters of Charity.48 The plaintiff in Cooper attempted to
apply agency by estoppel to a hospital which retained independent contractor
physicians to treat patients in their emergency room.49 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument, finding the hospital was not liable because the
defendant-physician was an independent contractor employed by a
third-party which the hospital had contracted with, and was not under the
control of the defendant-hospital. 50 Looking to the Johnson holding, the court
4249 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1943).
4 3 Id.
441d. at 928 (citations omitted).
45126 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio 1955).
46 d.
47The court cited the following comment from RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 265:
The fact that a person manifests to a third person that another is his
agent or servant does not of itself cause harm. It is only where there
has been some reliance by a third person upon the appearance of a
principal and agent or a master and servant relationship that such
appearance can be the basis of liability, and then only if a subsequent
harm is in some manner induced by the reliance. Except in such cases,
therefore, a person is not liable for the... negligence... of an apparent
servant or agent.
Id. at 601.
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found no induced reliance on the part of the plaintiff and, further, the court
stated, "[T]he practice of medicine by a licensed physician in a hospital is not
sufficient to create an agency by estoppel, as alleged by appellant."5 1
B. The Hannola Decision
Ohio first found a hospital liable for the tortious acts of a staff physician
employed as an independent contractor in Hannola v. City of Lakewood.52 In
Hannola, the court of appeals held that a hospital may not contract with a third
party to insulate itself from liability for the acts of doctors who are independent
contractors treating patients at a hospital. 53 The court relied on the doctrine of
apparent agency in reaching their decision.
The plaintiff, Liisa Hannola, brought a wrongful death action against
Lakewood Hospital, the City of Lakewood, Milton J. MacKay, M.D. and the
West Shore Medical Care Foundation, Inc., alleging medical negligence on the
part of all defendants, arising from the care and treatment her husband, the
decedent, received at the Lakewood Hospital Emergency Room. 54 Defendants
Lakewood Hospital and the City of Lakewood asserted they were immune
from liability for any tortious acts that may have been committed, on the basis
that the emergency room was operated by West Shore Medical Care
Foundation as an independent contractor.55
The court acknowledged the tension between the hospital's freedom to
contract and the public's perception of a full-service hospital, but found, by
operating emergency rooms, hospitals make "special statement[s] to the
public." 56 The court concluded that a full-service hospital establishes an agency
by estoppel by holding itself out to the public as a provider of comprehensive
health care, which negates the hospital's ability to immunize itself from liability
through contractual relationships with third parties.
57
The Hannola court adopted the definition of agency by estoppel set forth by
the Ohio Supreme Court in Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co.5 and Johnson v.
51Id. at 104.




56426 N.E.2d at 1190.
571d. The court stated:
In essence, an agency by estoppel is established by creating an effect:
that is, the appearance that the hospital's agents, not independent
contractors, will provide medical care to those who enter the hospital.
The patient relies upon this as a fact and he believes he is entering a
full-service hospital.
Id.
5834 N.E.2d 202 (Ohio 1941). See text cited supra note 38.
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Wagner Provision Co.59 In applying these decisions, however, the court found
that the doctrine should apply differently to a hospital than to a commercial
enterprise as the latter may have more success in disclaiming agency through
advertising.60 The Hannola court commented that hospitals, specifically those
with emergency rooms, deal with emergency situations which often result in
the denial of a patient's ability to make a conscious, informed decision as to
where they are treated and by whom.61 This reasoning of the Hannola court
implied that a hospital cannot effectively disclaim agency.
To justify its departure from the supreme court's earlier decisions which
refused to find a hospital liable for the acts of doctors retained as independent
contractors,62 the Hannola court found that a "hospital," especially one with an
emergency room, "makes a special statement to the public when it opens its
emergency room to provide emergency care for people."63
The Hannola court did not expressly state whether it looked to Agency § 267
or Torts § 429, but did refer to the Johnson decision for its definition of agency
5949 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1943). The Johnson court defined agency by estoppel as:
The doctrine of agency by estoppel, as it might be invoked by a
plaintiff in a tort action, rests upon the theory that one has been led
to rely upon the appearance of agency to his detriment. It is not
applicable where there is no showing of induced reliance upon an
ostensible agency.
Id. at 926. Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187,1189 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
60426 N.E.2d at 1190.
61id.
62 See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971):
We find no error in the trial court's determination that appellee Sisters
of Charity were not liable for the negligence of appellees Dr. Hansen
and Emergency Professional Service Group, should that be established.
... Appellee Dr. Hansen was an employee of appellee Emergency Pro-
fessional Service Group, and was not under the control of the hospital
.. Moreover, the practice of medicine by a licensed physician in a
hospital is not sufficient to create an agency by estoppel, as alleged by
appellant. Nowhere is 'induced reliance' shown by the appellant ....
Id. at 104.
63426 N.E.2d at 1190. The court quoted Jeffrey S. Leonard, Note, Independent Duty of
a Hospital to Prevent Physicians'Malpractice, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 953,967 (1973), for support
of its view of the modem hospital:
The image of modem hospitals as centers of medical practice of the
highest quality is understandably cultivated by the hospitals them-
selves. Nonprofit hospitals do not, of course, advertise as such. But
they do maintain a high degree of 'visibility' in the community
through fund-raising campaigns, community relations programs,
public service programs, press releases and the like, all presenting
the hospital as a unified institution vital to community health, rather
than as a mere physical shell in which private physicians practice their
profession.
426 N.E.2d at 1190.
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by estoppel. 64 Hannola construed the Johnson test as a hybrid of these
Restatement sections. However, if Agency § 267 were strictly applied by the
Hannola court, the plaintiff would have been required to show that her decedent
actually thought the emergency room physician, who rendered the negligent
treatment, worked for the defendant. Instead, the court applied Agency § 267
by requiring the plaintiff to show a representation, but then clearly shifted to
Torts § 429 when it found the plaintiff's reliance on the reputation of the
hospital sufficient to meet the test.65 This intermingling of Restatement sections
began the confusion in Ohio regarding agency by estoppel and apparent
agency.66
C. Albain v. Flower Hospital: Strict Adherence to § 267
A decade after the Hannola decision, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the
issue of agency by estoppel previously addressed at the appellate level. In
Albain v. Flower Hospital,67 the Ohio Supreme Court redefined the standard a
plaintiff must meet in order to successfully assert agency by estoppel. The court
rejected the appellate court's holding in Hannola, that the mere granting of staff
privileges by a hospital to a physician constitutes "control" for purposes of
establishing an agency by estoppel, 68 and redefined what test should be
applied by a court in order to determine whether an apparent agency has been
created. 69
Recognizing that courts across the nation look to Agency § 267, Torts § 429,
or both, the Albain court expressly adopted Agency § 267, which the court felt
was consistent with their prior decisions in Rubbo, Johnson, and Councell.70 The
court reasoned that strict adherence to § 267 was preferable over the hybrid
adopted by Hannola.71 The Hannola court found the mere existence of a hospital
641d. at 1189.
651d. at 1191.
66 For further discussions on Hannola v. City of Lakewood, see Ruth Bope Dangel,
Case Comment, Hospital Liability for Physician Malpractice: The Impact of Hannola v. City
ofLakewood, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 1077 (1986).
67553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990), overruled in part by Clark v. Southview Hosp., 628
N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
6 8 TheAlbain court stated: "A hospital's granting of staff privileges toan independent
private physician, which the hospital may later revoke under its review procedures,
does not establish the requisite level of authority or control over such physician to justify




71The Albain court stated:
The Hannola analysis rests on two faulty premises. First, that court
relies on the theory of independent duty which we have rejected
above. Second, that court holds that, in every case, an implied induce-
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emergency room constituted a "holding out" to the public that the hospital
controlled the acts of its emergency room physicians.72 However, the Albain
court determined that this finding directly contradicted the policy set forth by
Cooper73: "[T]he practice of medicine by a licensed physician in a hospital is
not sufficient to create an agency by estoppel."74
The Albain court held that in order for a hospital to be liable for the acts of
physicians retained as independent contractors under the theory of agency by
estoppel, a plaintiff must show the following factors: "(1) the hospital made
representations leading the plaintiff to believe that the negligent physician was
operating as an agent under the hospital's authority, and (2) the plaintiff was
thereby induced to rely upon the ostensible agency relationship."75 The court
stated that the outcome of the second prong of this test would turn on whether
the plaintiff relied on the ostensible agency relationship between the hospital
and the doctor, rather than the reputation of the hospital.76
In Albain, Sharon Albain and her husband filed a wrongful death action
against the hospitals and doctors which treated Sharon for fetal distress,
alleging that the defendants were negligent in the care and treatment of her in
the Flower Hospital Emergency Room. Noting that reliance is rarely present in
emergency situations, the court found no evidence which established that the
appellee-patient relied on an agency relationship between the independent
contractor-physician and the appellant-hospital.7 7 In making this
determination, the court analyzed whether the on-call, staff physician ever
discussed her employment status with the patient, the beliefs of the patient as
to whether emergency room physicians were employees of the hospital, and
whether the hospital made any representations to the patients as to the
employment status of their physicians.78
Undoubtedly, the Albain test set forth a strict standard for a plaintiff to meet,
but this decision was consistent with the legal principles embodied in the
Restatement and Ohio precedent. Unlike the hybrid set forth by Hannola, the
ment 'is established by creating an effect.' In that court's view, the
mere existence of a hospital with emergency room facilities consti-
tutes an inducement that all its physicians therein are acting under
the hospital's direction and control. This is hardly consistent with
that court's statement that the mere practice of medicine by a licensed
physician in a hospital is insufficient to create an agency by estoppel.
Id.
72426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
73272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971).
74553 N.E.2d 1038, 1049 (Ohio 1990).
75 d. (citations omitted).
761d. at 1049-50.
77 d. at 1050.
78553 N.E.2d at 1050.
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Albain test looked to sound legal doctrine for its application of agency by
estoppel, rather than inventing a means of imposing liability based solely on
public policy grounds.
D. The Ohio Supreme Court Revisits and Reverses Albain: Clark v. Southview
Hospital
On March 16, 1994, in Clark v. Southview Hospital & Family Health Center,79
the Supreme Court of Ohio overturned, in part, its decision in Albain. Clark
rejected Albain's strict adherence to Agency § 267 and, instead, chose to adopt
a more refined version of the hybrid of Agency § 267 and Torts § 429 previously
set forth by the appellate court in Hannola.80
In Clark, the decedent, Kimberly Sierra, was treated by an emergency-room
physician, Thomas Mucci, D.O., at Southview Hospital's Emergency Room
(ER), on August 25, 1986 for an asthma attack from which she subsequently
died.81 Dr. Mucci was the president and sole shareholder of TMES, Inc., which
contracted with Southview to provide twenty-four hour physician staffing for
Southview's ER.82 The appellant, Edna K. Clark, alleged wrongful death as a
result of medical negligence on "the part of Southview through its agents
and/or employees, Dr. Mucci and TMES."83 Clark settled with Dr. Mucci and
TMES prior to trial.84
At trial, Clark testified she advised her daughter to go to Southview's ER in
a medical emergency, as Southview had physicians on duty twenty-four
hours.85 She also stated she knew of Southview's ER from Southview's
administration department as well as from promotional materials distributed
by the hospital.86 Clark further testified that, from these sources, she formed
the belief that the physicians who worked at Southview's ER, "worked for the
hospital and were hospital doctors," and that she relayed this information to
the decedent.87 According to her testimony, she was never informed
otherwise.8 8 The promotional material produced by Southview and admitted
into evidence, did not mention TMES nor whether the physicians who staffed








87628 N.E.2d at 47.
881d.
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their ER were employees or independent contractors.89 The trial court ruled in
favor of the plaintiff, Clark.90
The Appellate Court of Montgomery County reversed on the grounds that
the plaintiff-administratrix failed to meet the Albain test, which required her to
show the following: (1) the hospital made representations leading Kimberly
Sierra, the decedent, to believe that Dr. Mucci was an employee of Southview,
and (2) the decedent was thereby induced to rely upon the ostensible agency
relationship to prove agency by estoppel. 91 The appellate court found
insufficient evidence to meet the first part of this test; that Southview had made
affirmative representations to the decedent or the public that their ER
physicians, including Dr. Mucci, were employees of the hospital.92
In reviewing the appellate court's decision, the Ohio Supreme Court did not
find fault with the lower court's application of the Albain test, but rather with
the Albain decision itself.93 Refusing to follow the doctrine of stare decisis, the
Clark court partially overturned Albain, based on the following criticisms: (1)
Albain defined the doctrine of agency by estoppel too narrowly; (2) Albain
misinterpreted Michigan's test for agency by estoppel set forth in Grewe v.
89The promotional and marketing materials of Southview which were
admitted into evidence consisted of various pamphlets, brochures
and an 'Emergency Handbook & Physician Directory.' Also admitted
into evidence were various newspaper advertisements and the contents
of radio and television advertisements.... [T]he promotional literature
contains statements such as: 'We welcome the opportunity to serve our
community in this way, to supplement our full range of inpatient and
outpatient medical care'; 'You'll find facts about the hospitals' emer-
gency departments';... 'At Southview's emergency department, we
treat whole people, not just diseases and traumatic injuries'; 'Get more
information about our emergency facilities'; 'Paramedics call the emer-
gency department from the scene, and by the time the patient is stabil-
ized and brought to the hospital, the surgical team is ready'; 'Southview
Hospital provides the full range of patient care'; and 'Our business is
your good health, not just the cure of ill health.'
Id.
901d. at 48.
91Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., Nos. 12845 & 13060, 1992 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4516 (Sept. 2,1992) [citing Albain, 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990)].
921992 Ohio App. LEXIS at "11-12.
93 1n attempting to apply Albain to the facts of this case, we find ourselves
questioning the very basis of the holding.... [W]e are not unmindful
of the doctrine of stare decisis which dictates adherence to judicial
decisions. Stare decisis, however, was not intended to effect a 'petri-
fying rigidity,' but to assure the justice that flows from certainty and
stability. If, instead, adherence to precedent offers not justice but un-
fairness, not certainty but doubt and confusion, it loses its right to
survive, and no principle constrains us to follow it.
628 N.E.2d 46,48-49 (Ohio 1994) [quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3,9 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1957)].
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Mount Clemens General Hospital;94 (3) Albain also misinterpreted Ohio's prior
adoption of agency by estoppel in Rubbo;95 and (4) the second prong of Albain's
test made it "virtually impossible" for a plaintiff, especially in a wrongful death
case, to establish reliance.%
The Clark court found Albain misinterpreted both Rubbo and Grewe by
requiring a showing of induced reliance, the second prong of the Albain test.
97
Looking to nationwide applications of agency by estoppel, Clark overruled
Albain's second prong, finding that no other jurisdiction had applied agency
by estoppel as strictly.9 8
Like Hannola, the Clark court chose to ignore both Johnson's and Councell's
requirement of demonstrating induced reliance in order to find agency by
estoppel. Instead, the court refused to expressly adopt Agency § 267 or Torts
§ 429, and set forth a hybrid of the two, similar to that in Hannola. Clark held a
hospital may be liable under agency by estoppel where: (1) "it holds itself out
to the public as a provider of medical services" and (2) "in the absence of notice
or knowledge to the contrary, the patient looks to the hospital, as opposed to
the individual practitioner, to provide competent medical care.'9 9
The supreme court justified its departure from Albain on the grounds of
public policy and the holdings of other jurisdictions.100 The court commented
that nearly every jurisdiction's test for establishing agency by estoppel
complied with Ohio's decision in Rubbo, rendering Albain's requirement of
establishing reliance on the alleged agency relationship erroneous. 101
Furthermore, the court reasoned that their decision to weaken the requirements
for agency by estoppel was consistent with public policy.102 In the court's view,
the modem hospital is an industrialized, "complex full-service institution[],
[and] the emergency room has become the community medical center, serving
as the portal of entry to the myriad of services available at the hospital."10 3 This
view, according to the court, along with the hospital industry's overall use of
the media for advertising, justifies the public's expectation and assumption
"that the hospital is the medical provider it purports to be."104
94273 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. 1978).
9534 N.E.2d 202 (Ohio 1941). See discussion supra Section III.A.
96628 N.E.2d at 49-52.
97 d. at 52.
98 d. at 50.
9 9 d. at 53.
100628 N.E.2d at 53-54.
101 d. at 52.
1 0 2 M. at 53.
103 Id.
104628 N.E.2d at 53.
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Under the Clark test, the only available defense to a hospital is to prove the
injured party had notice or knowledge that the treating physician was not
employed by the hospital. 105 This standard is nearly impossible for a
defendant-hospital to meet, as patients, in the context of an emergency
situation, are often unconscious or in an otherwise traumatic situation, leaving
little if no opportunity to supply a patient with such knowledge. The Clark
decision gives no suggestion as to how a defendant can overcome this hurdle
and does nothing to aid defendants in such circumstances.
Clark requires notice to be given at "a meaningful time," but fails to direct
how such notice may be effected. 106 The court expressly rejected the suggestion
that an emergency room could post signs to notify patients that the physicians
therein were independent contractors rather than employees of the hospital, in
an attempt to disclaim this liability.107 The Clark court found such notice would
not be "meaningful," as a patient, by presenting herself to the emergency room,
has already formed a belief about the hospital and/or its emergency room:
"Even if the patient understood the difference between an employee and an
independent-contractor relationship, informing her of the nature of the
relationship after she arrives is too late."108
Chief Justice Moyer, in his dissent to the Clark decision, stated the "majority
of the court persists in its eagerness to overrule recent and well-reasoned
precedent," that the facts presented satisfied the Albain test for agency by
estoppel, and overturning Albain was unnecessary.109 Moyer commented that
rather than overturning Albain, the court could have softened its holding if it
felt it was too harsh a standard for a plaintiff to meet, by refusing to follow the
dicta set forth by Albain in regard to the means by which a plaintiff could
establish that she was induced to rely.110 The Chief Justice based his dissent, in
part, on his opinion that the court's new test imposed too harsh a standard for
1051d.
1 0 6 1d. at 54.
107Id. at 54 n.1.
108628 N.E.2d at 54 n.1 ('"The purpose of any notice requirement is to impart
knowledge sufficient to enable the plaintiff to exercise an informed choice. The signs
suggested by the dissent are too little, too late.") (quoting from, Steven R. Owens, Note,
Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital and the Evolution of Hospital Liability: Wisconsin
Adopts Apparent Agency, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1129, 1147).
109628 N.E.2d at 55.
1101f the Albain standard unduly limits the class of potential plaintiffs, the
more jurisprudentially sound approach would be to modify, interpret
or soften the holding of that case instead of conducting the radical
surgery performed by the majority opinion. For example, this court
could choose not to follow the dicta in Albain that the plaintiff prove
that he or she would have refused treatment had he or she known of
the agency relationship. This is the difference between the incremental
development of the common law and judicial legislation.
Id. at 56 (citation omitted).
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a defendant-hospital to meet, and would only result in an escalation of the
continuing rise of health care costs.111
Of the few reported decisions which apply the Clark decision, Costell v. Toledo
Hospital112 undoubtedly provides the most thorough discussion. In Costell, the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant-hospital was
reversed, based on the appellate court's finding that the plaintiff satisfied the
elements of the Clark test.113 The significance of the Costell decision rests in its
extension of agency by estoppel from physicians in the emergency room to an
anesthesiologist, who assisted in the decedent's surgery.114 The court
concluded that this extension was warranted as, "Appellant's late husband...
never had to make an affirmative choice about who would be the
anesthesiologist at the surgery. Indeed, as appellant points out, her late
husband never met the anesthesiologist until he entered the operating
room."115
Further application of the Clark decision occurred in Stovall v. Brown
Memorial Hospital,116 and Doe v. Ohio State University Hospital & Clinics.117 In
Doe, the plaintiff sought to apply the Clark test in order to hold the Ohio State
University Hospital liable for a doctor's failure to obtain the plaintiff's consent
to an HIV test.118 Although the Doe court determined an agency by estoppel
was created, the hospital escaped liability due to the plaintiff's failure to satisfy
other elements of his claim.119 Likewise, the defendant-hospital in Stovall
escaped liability, although solely due to the plaintiff's failure to meet the
elements of the Clark test.120
Thus, although there are few opinions which construe the Clark decision, it
can be inferred from the Costell ruling that the doctrine of agency by estoppel
will continue to be expanded in Ohio courts.
111id. at 55.
112649 N.E.2d 35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
1 131d. at 41.
1 141d. at 40.
1151d. at 41.
116No. 94-A-0022, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5703 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16,1994).
117No. 94APIl1-1625, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4087 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1995).
1181d. at *13.
119"[T]he fact remains that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that [the
defendant-physician] 'knowingly' violated R.C. 3701.242(A). If plaintiff wishes to hold
defendant, as principal, responsible for the 'wrongful' acts of its agent,.. . then [the
doctor] must have violated the statute in some way." Id. at *15-16.
120The Stovall court refused to find an agency by estoppel as there was clear and
uncontroverted evidence of a prior physician-patient relationship (of over 20 years in
duration) between the plaintiff and the physician at issue. 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5703
at*8.
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IV. How AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL IS APPLIED NATIONWIDE
Courts across the nation have failed to recognize the distinction between
Agency § 267 and Torts § 429. Agency § 267 sets forth the standard by which
an agency by estoppel is created, and requires a plaintiff to show: (1) actual
reliance on the identity of the principal; and (2) that this reliance caused the
plaintiff to be exposed to the negligent conduct. 12 1
Torts § 429 sets forth the standard by which an apparent agency is created,
and is a more lenient standard than Agency § 267 as it does not require an
estoppel.122 Instead, Torts § 429 requires proof of a 'holding out" by the
apparent principal which would lead a reasonable person to conclude an
agency relationship existed. 123
Clearly, the elements of Agency § 267 are more difficult to meet, as a causal
relationship between the apparent principal's conduct and the plaintiff's
change of position in reliance must be shown.124 Torts § 429 does not require
an establishment of such a causal relationship.125
The Clark court correctly stated that the standard it set forth for agency by
estoppel is consistent with the vast majority of jurisdictions which have
adopted agency by estoppel to a hospital setting. 126 However, many of the
decisions cited by Clark in support of its holding erroneously claimed to adopt
Agency § 267, when in actuality, they adopted the more lenient standard
contained in Torts § 429. Ironically, the Albain decision, overruled by Clark, was
one of very few decisions which correctly construed Agency § 267 by holding
that a plaintiff must show actual reliance in order to successfully plead agency
by estoppel. Disliking the strict standard correct application of Agency § 267
imposed on a plaintiff under the Albain ruling, the Clark court avoided the issue
of whether to apply Agency § 267 or Torts § 429 by refusing to expressly adopt
either section.
12 1 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also Janulis & Hornstein, supra note
19.
12 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B, cmt. a (1958), states:
Estoppel is fundamentally a doctrine in the law of torts, sometimes
operating by creating liability, sometimes by denying a cause of action
which might otherwise accrue.... Its operation may create a defense
to an action or may give compensation to a person who otherwise
would be harmed by action which he had taken in reliance upon an
erroneous belief, either caused by the one estopped or not corrected by
him when he should have done so.
123 See supra note 20. See also Janulis & Homstein, supra note 19.
1 2 4 See Janulis & Hornstein, supra note 19, at 696-97.
12Nd.
126628 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ohio 1994).
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Clark also correctly concluded that the majority of jurisdictions which have
adopted agency by estoppel followed the approach taken by Michigan. 127 Like
Clark, Grewe did not expressly adopt Agency § 267 or Torts § 429. In fact, Grewe
made no mention of either section. Instead, Grewe based its adoption of agency
by estoppel solely on a 1942 California appellate decision. 128
Grewe's adoption of agency by estoppel may be one of the sources of the
nationwide misapplication of this doctrine. In Grewe, the defendant-hospital
was found vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of an orthopedic resident
retained by the hospital as an independent contractor.129 The Michigan
Supreme Court expressly imposed vicarious liability on the theory of agency
by estoppel but failed to require a causal relationship.130 The Grewe court
adopted the three-prong test for establishing agency by estoppel set forth by
Stanhope.
The person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the agent's
authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; ... such belief must
be generated by some act or neglect of the principal sought to be
charged; .. . and the third person relyinon the agent's apparent
authority must not be guilty of negligence.
Consequently, Grewe's labeling of its test as agency by estoppel, rather than
apparent agency, is a misnomer as the Stanhope test adopted by Grewe is actually
the standard contained in Torts § 429. Other jurisdictions which referred to
and/or relied on the Grewe decision, when determining how to apply this
doctrine to a hospital setting, may have exacerbated Grewe's misnomer by
innocently attempting to comport that decision with legal doctrines contained
in the Restatements.
The ensuing discussion will survey how state courts across the country
define and apply agency by estoppel under Agency § 267 and apparent agency
under Torts § 429. As this discussion will demonstrate, many courts, when
initially faced with determining how agency by estoppel should be applied to
a hospital setting, claimed to adopt Agency § 267, but erroneously negated the
requisite element of reliance. These courts failed to recognize that they actually
adopted Torts § 429, the more lenient standard. This negation resulted in an
abrogation of Agency § 267 and, moreover, a means by which a state can hold
a hospital, in essence, strictly liable for negligent treatment by their physicians
retained as independent contractors.
1271d. at 52; see Grewe v. Mount Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. 1978).
128273 N.W.2d at 434; see Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 128 P.2d
705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942).
129273 N.W.2d at 437.
1 3 0 1d. at 429.
1311d. at 434 (quoting Stanhope, 128 P.2d at 708).
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A. The States That Correctly Follow § 429 of the Second Restatement of Torts
Few jurisdictions have expressly adopted Torts § 429 as legal authority for
their adoption of apparent agency (often erroneously called agency by
estoppel). Torts § 429 requires a plaintiff to show the injured party accepted the
independent contractor's services under the reasonable belief that the
employer was providing the care.132 Essentially, this section requires a "holding
out" by the employer and a belief on the part of the plaintiff in said "holding
out."13 3
The first decision to correctly apply apparent agency under Torts § 429 was
Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital,134 decided by the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York in 1976. The Mduba court found Torts § 429 to be
the applicable legal principle, and stated:
It is, therefore, our conclusion that the defendant hospital, having held
itself out to the public as an institution furnishing doctors, staff and
facilities for emergency treatment, was under a duty to perform those
services and is liable for the negligent performance of those services
by the doctors and staff it hired and furnished to decedent. Certainly,
the person who avails himself of hospital facilities has a right to expect
satisfactory treatment from any personnel who are furnished by the
hospital.16
Citing the Mduba decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted
"ostensible agency" in Capan v. Divine Providence Hospital.136 Capan rejected the
traditional notion that a hospital should not be held vicariously liable because
it does not "undertake to treat the patient," on their conclusion that this notion
is no longer the reality for modern-day hospitals.137
The Capan court expressly adopted Torts § 429 and looked to the Mduba
decision, among others.138 The court stated that it based its extension of
vicarious liability for hospitals on the frequently cited rationale of the Supreme
Court of New York, in Bing v. Thunig:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but
undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own
responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their
manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish
13 2 See supra note 20.
13 3 See Janulis & Hornstein, supra note 19.
134384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
1351d. at 529-30.
136430 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
13 71d. at 649.
13 81d.
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facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large
staff of physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and
manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and
treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action.
139
In the mid-1980's, both Oklahoma and Mississippi decided cases factually
similar to Ohio's decision in Hannola. Oklahoma's Appellate decision, Smith v.
St. Francis Hospital, Inc., expressly adopted Torts § 429, and set forth the
following oft-cited quoted: "In our view, the critical question is whether the
plaintiff, at the time of his admission to the hospital, was looking to the hospital
for treatment of his physical ailments or merely viewed the hospital as the situs
where his physician would treat him for his problems."140 The Mississippi
Supreme Court, in Hardy v. Brantley relied on both Smith and Hannola for its
application of Torts § 429 and formulated an explicit test thereunder.141
In a rare decision to acknowledge the distinction between Agency § 267 and
Torts § 429, the Supreme Court of Alaska chose to apply the latter in Jackson v.
Power.142 The Jackson court concluded that Torts § 429 is the basis for ostensible
or apparent agency, while Agency § 267 is the basis for the agency by estoppel
doctrine and, moreover, that these terms should not be used
interchangeably. 143 Relying on a prior application of apparent agency to a
commercial case, the court chose to apply Torts § 429 on the grounds that
Alaska's prior application of ostensible agency to commercial cases provided
sufficient guidelines for medical malpractice cases.144
1391d. [citing Bing, 143 N.E.2d 3,8 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1957)].
140676 P.2d 279, 282 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
141471 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1985). The Hardy court held:
Where a hospital holds itself out to the public as providing a given
service, in this instance, emergency services, and where the hospital
enters into a contractual arrangement with one or more physicians
to direct and provide the service, and where the patient engages the
services of the hospital without regard to the identity of a particular
physician and where as a matter of fact the patient is relying upon
the hospital to deliver the desired health care and treatment, the
doctrine of respondeat superior applies .... [Wihere a patient engages
the services of a particular physician who then admits the patient to a
hospital where the physician is on staff, the hospital is not vicariously
liable for the neglect or defaults of the physician.
Id. at 371.
142743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
143 The Jackson court determined that under § 429, also known as ostensible or
apparent agency, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) whether the patient looks to the
institution, rather than the individual physician, for care; and (2) whether the hospital
'holds out' the physician as its employee. [While under Section 2671, the arguably stricter
standard. .. there must be actual reliance upon the representations of the principal by
the person injured." Id. at 1380 (citations omitted).
144Id.
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Connecticut chose to expand its application of apparent authority beyond
commercial issues in Francisco v. Hartford Gynecological Center145 and found a
hospital vicariously liable, under Torts § 429, for the negligence of a nurse
retained as an independent contractor, citing overwhelming policy reasons for
their extension of this doctrine.146 Although this case applied to a nurse, rather
than a physician, it is doubtful Connecticut will refrain from applying apparent
authority to a hospital where a staff physician/independent contractor is
negligent as well, as the Francisco court based its holding on numerous
decisions which applied agency by estoppel/apparent agency to hospitals with
physicians practicing as independent contractors.1 4
7
The above-referenced jurisdictions represent a minority of state courts which
correctly apply the test for apparent agency or agency by estoppel as they claim
to propound. The majority of jurisdictions claim to adopt Agency § 267 as the
basis for their applications of agency by estoppel rather than Torts § 429.
However, as the ensuing discussion will demonstrate, these claims are
erroneous as, in reality, these courts are actually mislabeling the elements of
Torts § 429.
B. The Nationwide Misconstruction and Misapplication of§ 267
This section surveys the state courts which expressly adopted Agency § 267,
and how they applied this test. The majority of states which expressly adopt
Agency § 267 fail to correctly construe the requisite elements of this section. To
satisfy the elements of Agency § 267, a plaintiff must show: (1) a representation
by the hospital that the allegedly negligent physician is a servant or agent of
the hospital; and (2) the injured party must have justifiably relied upon the skill
or care of the apparent agent to her detriment.
Most state courts apply agency by estoppel as a hybrid of Agency § 267 and
Torts § 429. These courts generally require a representation by the hospital
which is satisfied if a hospital held itself out as a provider of medical care, thus
meeting both Agency § 267 and Torts § 429. The application of the second
element of Agency § 267 is where these courts are mistaken.
145No. CV 92-0513841 S, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 521 (Mar. 1, 1994).
146The court cited the following policy reasons:
(1) The center here agreed to perform certain surgical procedures for
the plaintiff...; (2) When a patient agrees to have a surgical procedure
performed at a hospital or medical center, she has a right to rely on the
reputation of the hospital.. .; (3) A person enters a hospital or goes to a
medical center for a wide range of services rather than treatment by a
particular health professional...; (4) Public outrage would surely follow
an announcement by a medical center or hospital 'that it regards all staff
doctors as completely independent professionals, conducts no supervision
of their performance and takes no interest in their competence.'
Id. at 1 8-9 [quoting Hannola v. Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187,1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980)].
1471994 Conn. Super. LEXIS at * 4-5.
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The second prong of Agency § 267 requires a plaintiff to show actual reliance
upon the apparent authority of the hospital to control the allegedly negligent
physician. Instead of adhering to this requirement, many courts find "implied
reliance" and allow the second part of Agency § 267 to be satisfied upon a
showing of a reasonable belief that the particular hospital was rendering the
care in question. As a result, these courts typically formulate Agency § 267 to
require: (1) a holding out by the hospital which would cause a reasonable
person to assume that the hospital's physicians are its employees; and (2) that
the injured party looked to the hospital to provide competent medical care.
By allowing a plaintiff to satisfy the second element of Agency § 267 by
showing that she looked to the hospital to provide competent medical care,
these courts allow a plaintiff to satisfy Agency § 267 without showing actual
reliance. Such a construction of Agency § 267 results in an abrogation of agency
by estoppel, a doctrine firmly based on common understanding of vicarious
liability and agency theory. As such, Agency § 267 is rendered virtually
identical to Torts § 429.
The misapplication of the second prong of Agency § 267 may derive its
origins from two of the leading cases in the context of agency by estoppel,
Mehiman v. Powell148 and Grewe v. Mount Clemens General Hospital.149 In Grewe,
the Supreme Court of Michigan adopted the three prong test set forth by the
State of California in Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic,15o for
determining whether an emergency room staff physician was the ostensible
agent of the hospital.151 Citing the plaintiff's testimony, which established his
expectation to be treated by an employee of the hospital rather than a specific
physician, and a lack of evidence of a pre-existing physician-patient
relationship between the negligent physician and the plaintiff, the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld the finding that the hospital was vicariously liable.152
The Grewe court did not expressly adopt either Agency § 267 or Torts § 429.
Also relying on Stanhope as precedent, the Maryland Court of Appeals
adopted agency by estoppel in 1977 in Mehlman v. Powell.153 Mehiman
concluded a plaintiff may "rely" on a hospital to provide competent, complete
medical care due to the court's conclusion that hospitals are "engaged in the
148378 A.2d 1121 (Md. Ct. App. 1977).
149273 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. 1978).
150128 P.2d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942).
151273 N.W.2d at 434. The court stated:
First[,l the person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the
agent's authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; second[,J
such belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the principal
sought to be charged; third[,] and the third person relying on the agent's
apparent authority must not be guilty of negligence.
(quoting Stanhope, 128 P.2d at 708).
152273 N.W.2d at 434.
153378 A.2d 1121 (Md. Ct. App. 1977).
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business of providing health care services."154 As Mehiman was the first
decision to read Agency § 267 as allowing reliance to be implied from the
appearance of a hospital, it is possible that Mehlman is the basis for the
subsequent misapplication of Agency § 267 by other state courts.
To reach their conclusion, the Mehlman court distinguished its prior decision
of B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe,155 where the majority refused to find the defendant
liable under agency by estoppel as, in the Mehiman court's opinion, it was
common knowledge that gas/service stations are often independently
owned. 156 By making the distinction between franchised service stations and
hospital emergency rooms, it appears the Mehlman court concluded that it is
not common knowledge that hospitals typically staff their facilities with
physicians working as independent contractors. Neither finding is supported
by any evidence, nor does it appear the question of such "common knowledge"
was submitted to a jury. Therefore, because of this lack of evidentiary support
for their conclusions regarding what is common knowledge, it is apparent the
Mehiman court engaged in judicial legislation by extending agency by estoppel
to hospitals on a mere implication of reliance.
In Adamski v. Tacoma General Hospital,157 the Washington Court of Appeals
also looked to the Stanhope decision for guidance when faced with the question
of whether agency by estoppel could be applied to a medical malpractice case.
Adamski looked to the defendant-hospital's "holding out" as a provider of
emergency medical care services to the public, and concluded a jury could
reasonably find the allegedly negligent physician was an apparent agent of the
defendant-hospital. 15 8 For further support of this conclusion, the court looked
to the plaintiff's discharge instructions which informed him he could return to
the emergency room for follow-up care if necessary, and the fact that these
discharge papers had the hospital's letterhead printed on them.159 However,
the Adamski court said nothing about the plaintiff's actual beliefs or reliance on
the apparent agency.
Relying on the "appearance" of the hospital, Florida, like Michigan,
Maryland and Washington, looked to the Stanhope decision for its adoption of
agency by estoppel in Iruing v. Doctors Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc.160 Florida
expressly adopted Agency § 267, but, per usual, deviated from a strict
construction of that section. 161
154 Id. at 1124.
155370 A.2d 554 (Md. Ct. App. 1977).
156378 A.2d at 1124.
157579 P.2d 970 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
158Id. at 979.
1591d.
160415 So.2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1 6 1 The Irving court stated:
In those cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has
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Agency § 267 was also misapplied by Texas in Brownsville Medical Center &
Valley Community Hospital v. Garia.162 The Brownsville court found the hospital
held itself out as a provider of emergency medical services, and based its
findingof the plaintiffs' implied reliance on the following facts: (1) the hospital
administrator was responsible for overseeing the staffing of the emergency
room with physicians; (2) the hospital had entered into a contract with
independent physicians to provide physicians to staff the emergency room; (3)
a person entering Brownsville's emergency room would never request a
specific physician by name; and (4) testimony demonstrating that a potential
or actual patient entering the emergency room would have no reason to know
the physicians therein were independent contractors. 163 The plaintiffs were not
required to establish their reliance on the appearance, nor were they required
to produce any evidence of an actual belief that the physician who cared for
their child in the emergency room was employed by Brownsville.
The Kentucky Supreme Court decision, Pain tsville Hospital Co. v. Rose,164 also
misapplied Agency § 267. The Paintsville court relied on numerous cases which
misapplied this doctrine, as well as California's post-Stanhope decision, Seneris
v. Haas,165 for its test for agency by estoppel. 166 Seneris applied the Stanhope
test 167 to a case involving an anesthesiologist practicing in the
defendant-hospital as an independent contractor.168
The Paintsville court also relied on dicta set forth in Bing v. Thunig,169 and
based its particular application of agency by estoppel on the role that it
perceived modem-day hospitals to have in today's society.1 70 The Paintsville
held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that
a patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable
belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital, then the hospital
will be liable for the physician's negligence.
Id. at59.
162704 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
1 6 31d. at 75.
164683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985).
165291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955).
166683 S.W.2d at 257.
167See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
168291 P.2d at 927.
169143 N.Eid 3, 8 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1957). See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
170The Paintsvzile court stated:
The circumstances under which the hospital is liable are not unlimited.
But the operation of a hospital emergency room open to the public, where
the public comes expecting medical care to be provided through normal
operating procedures within the hospital, falls within the limits for appli-
cation of the principles of ostensible agency and apparent authority.
683 S.W.2d at 258.
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court pronounced that it would be "astonishing" for a court to require a patient
to inquire about the employment status of physicians who treat them in an
emergency room.171
The dissenting opinion to the Paintsville majority recognized the majority's
misconstruction of Agency § 267 and, like Justice Moyer in the Clark opinion,172
vehemently disagreed with the majority's interpretation of that section, finding
they wholly disregarded Agency § 267's requisite element of reliance.173
Wisconsin looked to the Paintsville decision for its application of agency by
estoppel in Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital.174 The Pamperin court
unequivocally held that a plaintiff need only demonstrate she entered the
hospital of her own volition and relied on the hospital to provide "complete
emergency room care" in order to meet the burden of establishing reliance
under agency by estoppel.175
In reply to the defendant-hospital's contention that the court's standard for
agency by estoppel would result in liability for the hospital in nearly every case
where it was asserted by a plaintiff, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned
that a hospital would not be vicariously liable when a patient chose to have a
specific physician render treatment. 176 This response by the Pamperin court
evaded the issue the defendant-hospital was presenting, specifically that the
test set forth by the court would, in all likelihood, result in strict liability for
hospitals for any and all negligent medical treatment of physicians practicing
as independent contractors. The instances where a patient actually chooses a
particular physician are few in comparison to instances where a patient makes
no such choice.
Like Paintsville and Clark, the Pamperin dissent objected to the majority's
construction of agency by estoppel, finding that the courts which apply this
doctrine in such a manner "misplace" the focus of it by allowing a plaintiff to
rely on the reputation of the defendant-hospital rather than on the apparent
agency relationship between the hospital and the physician.177 The Pamperin
dissent clearly recognized the distinction between agency by estoppel and
apparent agency and, presumably, advocated the adoption of the latter.
17 11d.
172See discussion, supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
173683 S.W.2d at 260.
174423 N.W.2d 848 (Wis. 1988).
1 7 5 1d. at 857.
1761d. at 856.
177Id. at 860. The dissent stated:
The majority improperly focuses, as did the courts in the cases cited
by the majority, on whether the plaintiff relied on the reputation of the
hospital.... This focus is misplaced; under the doctrine of apparent
authority, which is basically a theory of agency by estoppel, the question
is whether a patient reasonably relied on the apparent agency relationship,
not whether reliance was placed on the reputation of the hospital.
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Oregon's adoption of Agency § 267 as a basis for imposing agency by
estoppel is notable. In Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Board,178 the court
followed Adamski and reversed and remanded the lower court's finding of
non-liability on the grounds they found it was reasonable for the plaintiff to
rely on the holding out of the hospital. The notable aspect of the Themins
decision concerns the court's dissemination of this Restatement section. In
quoting Comment a to Agency § 267, the court deleted the second sentence of
the Comment, which refers to the requisite element of reliance.179 The Themins
court also failed to mention the necessity of a plaintiff to establish reliance,
actual or implied. Evidently, the Themins court found this element an
unnecessary consideration.
Relying primarily on the Paintsville decision, Georgia applied the doctrine
of agency by estoppel in Richmond County Hospital Authority v. Brown.180 The
Richmond court erroneously commented that Agency § 267 and Torts § 429 are
interchangeable doctrines, yet appeared to give a correct reading of Agency
§ 267.181 The court cited Agency § 267's example of a taxi cab company's
relationship to its drivers as a means of explaining agency by estoppel.182 By
citing this illustration, the Richmond court appeared to recognize the necessity
of actual reliance under § 267, but then dispelled this illusion by discussing
society's view of hospitals and how they have changed since their formation.183
Which section the Richmond court relied on and/or adopted is unclear, as
they discussed Agency § 267 more extensively than Torts § 429, but then cited
Capan184 for their instructions on remand: "If they can prove the hospital
represented to Isiah Brown that its emergency room physicians were its
employees and that he therefore justifiably relied on the skill of the doctors but
178637 P.2d 155 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
1791d. at 159. Comment a reads in its entirety:
The mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party
believes to be the defendant's servant is not sufficient to cause the
apparent master to be liable. There must be such reliance upon the mani-
festation as exposes the plaintiff to the negligent conduct. The rule
normally applies where the plaintiff has submitted himself to the care
or protection of an apparent servant in response to an invitation from
the defendant to enter into such relations with such servant. A mani-
festation of authority constitutes an invitation to deal with such servant
and to enter into relations with him which are consistent with the apparent
authority.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. a (emphasis added).
180361 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. 1987).
1 8 1 1d. at 166.
182Id.
1831d.
184430 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
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suffered injury due to the legal insufficiency of their medical services, the
hospital may be held liable therefor. 185
In White v. Methodist Hospital South,186 the Tennessee court looked to its prior
decision, Edmonds v. Chamberlain Memorial Hospital,187 for its conclusion that
agency by estoppel is a viable doctrine within their state. Admittedly following
the nationwide trend, the White court held that an inference of reliance derived
from circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for a plaintiff to establish
justified reliance. 188
Looking to Wisconsin's decision in Pamperin1 89 its neighbor state, Illinois
adopted agency by estoppel in Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital,190 and
ended the dispute among Illinois' Appellate Courts as to whether this doctrine
was applicable to hospitals. The Gilbert court noted that the lower court refused
to apply agency by estoppel on the grounds it was unreasonable to expect a
hospital to have any element or amount of control over a physician in an
emergency situation where "split-second decisions are required. 19 1 In rejecting
this reasoning, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on case law from other
jurisdictions to support its finding that the question of control is irrelevant due
to the status of modem hospitals as "big business."
192
Apparently, only two jurisdictions, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, have
deviated from the national trend of abrogating Agency § 267 by inferring
reliance from the alleged "holding out" of modem hospitals as providers of
complete, competent medical care. The Massachusetts Court of Appeals
refused to find an HMO (Health Maintenance Organization) vicariously liable
under agency by estoppel in Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n,193 but did
conclude that HMO's are subject to this doctrine. The Chase court denied
liability on the grounds the plaintiff did not have an actual belief that the
physician at issue was an employee or agent of the HMO and, thus, could not
prove reliance on the apparent agency.194 Even though the Chase court
ultimately applied the correct test under Agency § 267, the Massachusetts
Appellate Court failed to distinguish apparent agency (Torts § 429) from
185Richmond, 361 S.E.2d 164, 166-67 (Ga. 1987).
186844 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
187629 S.W.2d 28 (Ten. Ct. App. 1981).
188844 S.W.2d at 648.
189423 N.W.2d 848 (Wis. 1988).
190622 N.E.2d 788,794 (H. 1993).
1911d. at 793 [discussing the lower court's decision at 233 111. App.3d 372 (1992)].
1921d. [quoting Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 1992)].
193583 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991).
1 94 1d. at 255.
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agency by estoppel (Agency § 267), as evidenced by their reference to Hannola
and their mislabeling of the test they set forth as ostensible agency.195
Rhode Island also strictly construed Agency § 267 in Rodrigues v. Miriam
Hospital.1% The Rodrigues court promulgated the following three-prong test for
agency by estoppel pursuant to their reading of Agency § 267 and prior Rhode
Island case law dealing with this doctrine in contractual settings:
The patient must establish (1) that the hospital, or its agents, acted in
a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
physician was an employee or agent of the hospital, (2) that the patient
actually believed the physician was an agent or a servant of the
hospital, and (3) that the patient thereby relied to his detriment upon
the care and skill of the allegedly negligent physician.
197
Applying this heightened standard to the evidence propounded by the
plaintiff, the Rodrigues court denied her allegation of agency by estoppel and
concluded there was insufficient evidence of any actual belief by the plaintiff
that the allegedly negligent physician was employed by the hospital, resulting
in a failure to establish justified reliance. 198
V. CONCLUSION
The misapplication of Agency § 267 by the numerous state courts which have
adopted agency by estoppel results in defendant-hospitals located within these
states to be faced with an insurmountable burden to overcome. Where a
defendant-hospital is faced with an allegation of agency by estoppel, under
either Torts § 429 or the misapplied Agency § 267, their only hope for a
successful defense can be an admission by the plaintiff confirming she was fully
aware the hospital was not responsible for doctors working therein as
independent contractors, or, a settlement by the plaintiff with the allegedly
negligent physician.199
It is disconcerting that state courts continue to impose liability upon
hospitals under the deep pocket theory when it no longer furthers public policy
or the interests of the citizens of the state, as this theory ultimately places the
monetary burden on the health care consumer. The soundness of this trend is
further weakened by the fact that physicians generally have ample insurance
coverage to ensure payment of any adverse judgment, rendering the need for
19 51d.
196623 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1993).
1971d. at 462.
198 1d.
199Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 797 (111. 1993) ("[Wle hold that
the rule announced in American National Bank that 'any settlement between the agent
and the plaintiff must also extinguish the principal's vicarious liability' ... stands
regardless of whether the plaintiff's covenant not to sue the agent expressly reserves the
plaintiff's right to seek recovery from the principal.") (citation omitted).
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an alternate payor moot Furthermore, a majority of states actually require
physicians to obtain medical malpractice liability insurance when applying for
a license to practice medicine within their state.
In Ohio, it is unlikely that court decisions will further the public interest in
lowering health care costs, at least not in the area of medical malpractice
adjudication. This is evidenced not only by the decision to overrule Albain, but
also by the extension of the Clark decision by the Costell court.
If Agency § 267 were applied correctly, a plaintiff would have to produce
evidence of her beliefs regarding the employment status of the treating
physician and that she relied on this belief to her detriment. A defendant
hospital, in turn, could then attempt to rebut this evidence by means of
discovery and cross-examination. Although Agency § 267's requirements are
difficult for a plaintiff to meet, they are dearly preferable, so the determination
of liability rests on fact rather than merely on the existence of a hospital.
COLLEEN MORAN 20 0
200The author wishes to express her gratitude to Phyllis J. Crocker, Professor of Law
at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for her guidance and insight, and to Stephen J.
Hupp, Esq.
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